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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by Dean Campbell, a Pennsylvania 
prison inmate, whose petition for writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) was denied by the District 
Court. Campbell contends that, because his trial counsel 
did not properly inform him of his right to testify at trial, 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by interfering with 
his constitutional right to testify. In the alternative, 
Campbell seeks a new evidentiary hearing, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2), so that the District Court can complete 
the factual record on which his substantive claim rests. 
Campbell contends that the state courts failed to make a 
finding of historical fact as to whether trial counsel 
informed him that it was his choice to testify on his own 
behalf. Without such a finding, he argues, it is impossible 
to address the merits of his substantive claim. 
 
We reject both of Campbell's claims. Addressing the 
S 2254(e)(2) claim first, we hold that, while they were not 
artfully expressed, the state trial court made sufficient 
findings of fact regarding Campbell's communications with 
his trial counsel. That court's written opinion made it clear 
that the court implicitly found that Campbell's trial counsel 
informed him of his right to testify. This implicit factual 
finding, which is binding under the federal habeas statute 
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and Supreme Court precedent, undermines Campbell's 
substantive constitutional claim. 
 
Turning to Campbell's substantive claim, we hold that, 
on the facts presented, the state appellate court's 
conclusion that Campbell's trial counsel did not render 
ineffective assistance or interfere with his right to testify in 
warning Campbell that testifying on his own behalf might 
be unwise was not " `contrary to' or an`unreasonable 
application of ' clearly established federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court," Matteo v. 
Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 887 (3d Cir. 
1999) (en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1)), nor was it 
reached " `based on an unreasonable determination of the 
facts in light of the evidence,' " id. at 887-88 (quoting 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(d)(2)). Accordingly, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court denying habeas relief.1  
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History  
 
The facts before the state trial court may be summarized 
as follows. One night in January 1983, Campbell and his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note that Campbell's constitutional claim is something of a hybrid. 
He does not allege that the Commonwealth deprived him of his right to 
testify--the normal scenario in a right-to-testify claim, see, e.g., Rock 
v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (holding that state's evidentiary rules 
interfered with criminal defendant's right to testify on his or her own 
behalf)--but rather that his trial counsel's ineffective assistance 
interfered with that right. (For the sake of convenience, throughout the 
opinion we refer to Campbell's claim as his "right-to-testify/ineffective- 
assistance claim.") 
 
As we ultimately conclude that Campbell's counsel did not interfere 
with his right to testify or render ineffective assistance, see infra Part 
III, 
we do not address the standard by which we would judge the 
harmlessness or prejudicial nature of counsel's actions had they been 
ineffective or injurious to Campbell's right to testify. This appears to 
be 
an open question, and the parties disagree about which standard should 
apply. Campbell argues that because the right to testify is a fundamental 
right, the denial of that right should per se  render a trial unfair. 
Counsel 
for the Commonwealth argues that because Campbell's claim hinges on 
a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984), actual prejudice standard 
should apply. We take no position in this dispute. 
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brother, Michael, waited at an intersection at the end of a 
freeway off-ramp in Chester, Pennsylvania. John Maletsky 
and his four-year old daughter, Kimberly, drove down the 
off-ramp and waited at the stop light. Campbell and 
Michael approached the car. Campbell pulled Maletsky 
from the car and shot him twice. Michael jumped into the 
car and drove away with the child still in the passenger 
seat. 
 
Maletsky's wife, Deborah, who had been following her 
husband in another car, arrived on the scene shortly 
thereafter. She saw her husband struggling with Campbell 
near a curb, but did not see his car or their daughter. She 
called to her husband, and he pointed in the direction that 
Michael had driven. Deborah looked down the street and 
saw that her husband's car had been immobilized by ice. 
Campbell approached Deborah's car and grabbed her 
handbag. Deborah and Campbell began to struggle. After 
she pulled a hat from his head, Campbell ran down the 
street with Deborah's handbag. Deborah ran toward her 
husband's car, where she found Michael inside the car with 
their child. She convinced Michael to let her take the child. 
Michael then ran away. Maletsky died later that evening 
from gunshot wounds to the chest and stomach. 
 
Campbell and Michael fled to Louisiana, but were 
apprehended there by local authorities. After the authorities 
gave Campbell the proper warnings, Campbell waived his 
rights and voluntarily confessed (with a great deal of 
contrition) that he had shot Maletsky and committed a 
number of other crimes against Maletsky and his wife. He 
thereafter waived the right to an extradition hearing and 
was transferred to Pennsylvania. Upon his arrival, the 
Commonwealth charged him with murder (18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. S 2502), theft (id. S 3902), kidnapping (id. S 2901), 
reckless endangerment (id. S 2705), possessing the 
instruments of crime (id. S 907), and criminal conspiracy to 
commit other offenses (id. S 903). 
 
Campbell's trial counsel was a public defender without a 
great deal of experience. He and Campbell disagreed on 
trial strategy. Trial counsel's greatest concern, given the 
heinous nature of Campbell's crimes, was that his client 
not be sentenced to death. Campbell did not take the 
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witness stand at trial, but he later asserted that he had 
wanted to take the stand so that he could explain his 
confession, assert an intoxication defense, and try to avoid 
a life sentence. Trial counsel responded that he counseled 
against such a strategy on the grounds that recanting his 
grief-ridden confession might alienate the jury and expose 
Campbell to a death sentence. 
 
After a three-day trial, in May 1984, Campbell was 
convicted on all counts (the jury returned a second-degree 
murder conviction). On January 2, 1985, the trial judge 
sentenced him to serve a term of life imprisonment on the 
murder count and to consecutive terms aggregating to 13 to 
39 years on the five other counts. Post-trial motions filed by 
Campbell's trial counsel were denied. 
 
Campbell's trial counsel initiated but failed to perfect 
Campbell's appeal, to which he had a right under 
Pennsylvania law. Objecting to this failure, Campbell filed a 
pro se petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act 
(PCHA) on May 2, 1986; an amended pro se petition on 
November 10, 1986; and a third petition, with the 
assistance of counsel, on January 4, 1987. In these papers, 
he asserted several grounds to support an ineffective- 
assistance-of-counsel claim, primarily focusing on the fact 
that trial counsel had failed to file a timely appellate brief, 
thereby precluding him from pursuing his right to appeal. 
In attempting to preserve his right to appeal, Campbell 
asked for an exception to statutory time-bar provisions in 
the form of permission to file a nunc pro tunc  appeal with 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court--an intermediate appellate 
court. In addition to his nunc pro tunc request, among other 
things, he asserted that his trial counsel (1) interfered with 
his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf; (2) 
failed to emphasize the level of his intoxication at the time 
he committed the crime; and (3) failed to remove himself 
from the case in light of his inexperience. 
 
On March 4, 1987, the PCHA court, which had also been 
the trial court, held an evidentiary hearing as it was 
required to do under Pennsylvania law. See Commonwealth 
v. Stokes, 440 A.2d 591, 595 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). At this 
hearing, the PCHA court undertook its duty to hear 
evidence regarding all of Campbell's claims that required 
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the development of a factual record. See Commonwealth v. 
Elliot, 466 A.2d 666, 668 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). The PCHA 
court heard evidence that Campbell's trial counsel had 
failed to perfect Campbell's appeal; that trial counsel had 
failed to assert Campbell's intoxication defense; and that 
trial counsel was so inexperienced--this was hisfirst 
homicide trial, at least according to Campbell--that in 
failing to seek his own withdrawal from the case, he 
rendered ineffective assistance. 
 
Most importantly for our purposes, the court heard 
evidence regarding Campbell's contention that trial counsel 
had interfered with his constitutional right to testify on his 
own behalf. In support of this claim, Campbell testified that 
his trial counsel did not inform him of his right to testify, 
that he had wanted to testify, and that the reason he did 
not do so is that his trial counsel said not to. Trial counsel 
also testified. He admitted that he had cautioned Campbell 
against testifying, but insisted that he "[a]bsolutely" told 
Campbell that it was Campbell's decision to take the stand. 
The relevant testimony is reproduced in the margin. 2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. On examination by his counsel at the PCHA hearing, Campbell 
testified as follows: 
 
       Q: Did you indicate to [your trial counsel] that you wanted to 
testify 
       on your own behalf? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: Did you testify on your own behalf. 
 
       A: No. 
 
       Q: Why not? 
 
       A: Because he said not to, but I did want to testi fy because there 
       was a number of things that I could have said to the jury . . . . 
 
       Q: Did [your trial counsel] indicate to you that you had the right 
to 
       testify on your own behalf? 
 
       A: He didn't come out and give it to me in no formal manner. He 
just 
       said, "I don't think you should testify ." 
 
Appendix at 28a (emphasis added). 
 
The testimony of Campbell's trial counsel on examination by 
Campbell's lawyer at the PCHA hearing is as follows: 
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Neither man's testimony was corroborated, and the 
conflicting testimony created a credibility dispute. 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the PCHA court 
determined that Campbell's trial counsel had negligently 
failed to file an appellate brief and that Campbell was 
entitled to a nunc pro tunc appeal. In a written opinion 
memorializing its decision, the court "refrained from ruling 
upon the merits of defendant's other grounds," 
Commonwealth v. Campbell, No. 666-84, at 2 (Pa. Ct. 
Common Pleas Jan. 6, 1988), as prescribed by 
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 442 A.2d 1133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1982).3 In so refraining, the court nonetheless attempted to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Q: Did you ever--did the Court ever ask my clien t why he was not 
       going to take the stand to testify on his own behalf? 
 
       . . . 
 
       A: I don't recall if we did it on the record or if  he and I just 
       discussed it at the counsel table together. I considered it that 
there 
       would be absolutely no way that he could take the stand and 
       preserve the question of trying to avoid the first degree murder 
       question. If he took the stand in my opinion, and I told him this, 
       that he could have the jury be alienated against him because his 
       confession . . . was somewhat mitigating in that he expressed 
       considerable remorse and if he were to take the stand and either 
       give a different story or either try to explain it away, in my 
opinion, 
       and I told him this, that I considered it to be a very substantial 
       possibility that the jury would consider that his remorse has now 
       been or had then been qualified. So I advised him not to take the 
       stand. 
 
       Q: But it was my client's position that he wanted to take the 
stand, 
       is that correct? 
 
       A: He wasn't certain as to what to do. 
 
       . . . 
 
       Q: Had you indicated to my client that he had a right to take the 
       stand if he decided to? 
 
       A: Absolutely, it was his decision, it was his  life. 
 
Appendix at 23a-26a (emphasis added). 
3. Miranda holds that "once the PCHA court determines petitioner has 
been deprived of his appellate rights, it should refrain from ruling upon 
the merits of the other claims and should grant petitioner the right to 
file 
an appeal nunc pro tunc." 442 A.2d at 1138. 
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fulfill its obligation under Miranda, see id. at 1138, to 
"make the findings of fact" necessary to"see to it that the 
record" was complete for the appellate court that would 
subsequently be hearing Campbell's nunc pro tunc  appeal, 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 444 A.2d 1291, 1293 n.2 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1982); see also Commonwealth v. Presbury, 467 
A.2d 898, 898 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (citing Pa. R. Crim. P. 
1506(5) and other "decided cases" as the source of this 
duty). 
 
The PCHA court made its findings of fact regarding 
Campbell's other ineffective-assistance claims in the 
following manner: 
 
       The court, following the mandates of Commonwealth v. 
       Miranda, supra, completed this record by allowing an 
       evidentiary hearing concerning the other issues raised 
       [the six ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims other 
       than the failure-to-file-an-appellate-brief claim]. Thus, 
       the record is complete for appellate purposes [citing 
       and quoting Miranda at length]. 
 
        It may be noted in passing that the allegedly new 
       issues raised by defendant at his Post Conviction 
       Hearing Act Hearing [the six other ineffectiveness 
       claims] were either disposed of in this court's original 
       Opinion [denying claims raised in post-trial briefing], or 
       are clearly unsupported by the records (for example this 
       was not trial counsel's first homicide trial . . . and the 
       issue of intoxication was placed before the jury . .. .) 
 
        The defendant has simply failed to carry his burden 
       of establishing ineffectiveness as to any specific issue 
       raised or collectively as to all of the issues raised. 
 
        Respecting the Appellate Court mandate hereinabove 
       cited, [Miranda] no further decision is made as to the 
       additional issues of ineffectiveness claimed by 
       defendant. The denial of his right to appeal has already 
       been remedied. This court does respectfully suggest 
       that the defendant's contention of ineffectiveness as to 
       the additional issues has not been established by the 
       evidence. 
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Commonwealth v. Campbell, No. 666-84, at 2-4 (Pa. Ct. 
Common Pleas Jan. 6, 1988) (emphasis added) (citations 
and footnote omitted). 
 
In these four paragraphs, the PCHA court did not 
explicitly resolve the credibility dispute between Campbell 
and his trial counsel regarding the right-to-testify/ 
ineffective-assistance claim. However, the Commonwealth 
contends that the court did so implicitly with its repeated 
mention that the evidence did not support Campbell's 
ineffectiveness claims other than his right to appeal claim. 
See infra Section II.C (discussing whether the PCHA court, 
in fact, made this finding). 
 
The Superior Court panel that heard Campbell's nunc pro 
tunc appeal did not advert to the PCHA court's failure to 
make an explicit finding regarding this disputed testimony. 
In its memorandum opinion, it reproduced the testimony 
given by Campbell's trial counsel at the PCHA hearing (also 
reproduced at supra note 2), without mentioning 
Campbell's testimony to the contrary. In ruling on the legal 
issue, the panel wrote: 
 
        This testimony [that of Campbell's trial counsel] 
       would indicate that [Campbell] made a decision not to 
       testify after full consultation. In addition, it appears 
       that counsel had a reasonable basis designed to 
       further appellant's interests, for not calling him to 
       testify. . . . We find no ineffectiveness in counsel's 
       action. 
 
Commonwealth v. Campbell, No. 1010 Philadelphia 1987, at 
8 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jul. 26, 1988) (citations omitted). Based 
on this analysis, the Superior Court rejected Campbell's 
right-to-testify/ineffective-assistance claim, along with the 
host of claims that Campbell had asserted. 
 
On April 18, 1997, Campbell filed a timely habeas 
petition, asserting several claims, including his right-to- 
testify/ineffective-assistance claim. The Magistrate Judge to 
whom the case was referred for a report or recommendation 
rejected all of Campbell's claims. Addressing Campbell's 
right to testify claim, she concluded "that the Superior 
Court's finding that Mr. Campbell decided not to testify 
after consultation with his counsel [was] not based on an 
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unreasonable determination of the facts in light[of] the 
evidence presented at the PCHA hearing." Campbell v. 
Vaughn, No. 97-2677, at 21-22 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 1998) 
(Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation) 
(emphasis added). Moreover, she concluded, neither was 
the "Superior Court's [legal conclusion] contrary to 
established Federal law" under the Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), ineffective-assistance-of- 
counsel standard. Campbell, No. 97-2677 at 22 (emphasis 
added). The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's 
findings and entered an order denying Campbell's petition 
for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
The District Court declined to grant a certificate of 
appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1); however, 
this court granted the certificate on June 14, 1999. See 
Campbell v. Vaughn, No. 98-1774 (3d Cir. June 14, 1999). 
In so doing, we limited the certificate of appealability to 
Campbell's right-to-testify/ineffective-assistance claim. See 
id. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. SS 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a). We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and 2253. 
 
II. Whether a New Evidentiary Hearing is Required 
 
The provisions of the federal habeas statute govern our 
review. It provides that "a determination of a factual issue 
made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The 
[habeas] applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the 
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 
evidence." 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(1). In interpreting this 
statute, the Supreme Court has held that an implicit 
finding of fact is tantamount to an express one, such that 
deference is due to either determination. See Parke v. 
Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35 (1992); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 
U.S. 422, 432-33 (1982); LaVallee v. Delle Rose , 410 U.S. 
690, 692 (1973) (per curiam); see also McAleese v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 172 (3d Cir. 1993); Ahmad v. 
Redman, 782 F.2d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
A. 
 
Campbell does not seek to introduce new evidence that 
would cast doubt upon the factual determinations made by 
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the state courts involved in this case. Rather, he argues 
that the PCHA court and the Superior Court made no 
factual "determination" to which we need to defer. In 
advancing this argument, he makes two contentions: (1) 
that both courts' treatment of the unresolved issue of fact 
created by Campbell's and his trial counsel's conflicting 
testimony was too indeterminate to be treated as a factual 
determination; and (2) that if the Superior Court made a 
definitive factual finding resolving this credibility dispute, 
the court did not have the power to do so under 
Pennsylvania law, and hence, its finding should be 
disregarded. Campbell therefore submits that, to resolve his 
substantive habeas claim, a new evidentiary hearing must 
be held--not so that new, or recently discovered, evidence 
may be introduced, but so that the District Court can 
determine, based on Campbell's live testimony and that of 
his trial counsel's whether, as a matter of fact, his trial 
counsel informed him that it was his decision whether to 
testify on his own behalf. 
 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA) amended the federal habeas statute in such a way 
as to limit the availability of new evidentiary hearings on 
habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2). Prior to AEDPA, 
new evidentiary hearings were required in several 
circumstances. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 
(1963) (listing six circumstances in which a hearing was 
required, including when "the material facts were not 
adequately developed at the state-court hearing"); Keeney v. 
Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (refining the 
Townsend standard by requiring that the petitioner "show 
cause for his failure to develop the facts in the state-court 
proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that 
failure," but not curtailing Townsend's list); see also 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(d) (1995) (amended by AEDPA, at 28 U.S.C.A. 
S 2254(e)(2) (West Supp. 1999)) (providing the pre-AEDPA 
standard for holding evidentiary hearings on habeas 
review). 
 
AEDPA, in contrast, permits evidentiary hearings on 
habeas review, but only in a limited number of 
circumstances. See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e).4 If Campbell is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. S 2254(e)(2) provides: 
 
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in 
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correct that the state courts failed to resolve the factual 
issue on which his habeas petition rests, a new evidentiary 
hearing would be permitted, as the failure to develop the 
factual record would not be his fault. AEDPA and uniform 
case law interpreting it provide that if the habeas petitioner 
"has diligently sought to develop the factual basis of a claim 
for habeas relief, but has been denied the opportunity to do 
so by the state court, S 2554(e)(2) will not preclude an 
evidentiary hearing in federal court." Cardwell v. Greene, 
152 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1998) (collecting court of 
appeals cases that agree with this proposition). 
 
However, even if a new evidentiary hearing is permitted 
under AEDPA--when it is solely the state's fault that the 
habeas factual record is incomplete--AEDPA, unlike 
Townsend and Keeney, does not require that such a 
hearing be held. Instead, federal courts have discretion to 
grant a hearing or not. In exercising that discretion, courts 
focus on whether a new evidentiary hearing would be 
meaningful, in that a new hearing would have the potential 
to advance the petitioner's claim. For example, in Cardwell, 
the court held that a new evidentiary hearing was 
permissible under AEDPA because it was the state's fault 
that the factual record was incomplete. See 152 F.3d at 
338. The court nonetheless went on to conclude that the 
district court did not err in refusing to grant the petitioner 
an evidentiary hearing, because the petitioner "ha[d] failed 
to forecast any evidence beyond that already contained in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing 
on the claim unless the applicant shows that-- 
 
       (A) the claim relies on-- 
 
       (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroac tive to cases on 
       collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 
       unavailable; or 
 
       (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously 
       discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 
 
       (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish 
by 
       clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no 
       reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 
       underlying offense. 
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the record" that would help his cause, "or otherwise to 
explain how his claim would be advanced by an evidentiary 
hearing." Id. 
 
Campbell, in contrast, has explained how a new hearing 
would advance his claim. Assuming arguendo, that he is 
correct that the Pennsylvania state courts did not resolve 
the credibility dispute between Campbell and his trial 
counsel, a new evidentiary hearing in which the Magistrate 
Judge or District Judge found that Campbell's testimony is 
to be believed would surely advance his right-to-testify/ 
ineffective-assistance claim. Such a finding would mean 
that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 
unconstitutionally interfering with his right to testify. If 
Campbell is wrong, and the state courts made a finding of 
fact to which we must defer, then a new evidentiary hearing 
would not only not advance his right-to-testify/ineffective- 
assistance claim, it would be forbidden under the precepts 
of S 2254(e)(2) and case law interpreting it, because there 
would be no factual deficiency that a federal habeas court 
could redress. 
 
B. 
 
In addressing Campbell's S 2254(e)(2) claim, the 
Magistrate Judge, the District Judge, the Commonwealth, 
and Campbell have all concentrated on the Superior Court's 
statement that the record "would indicate" that Campbell's 
trial counsel informed his client that it was his decision to 
testify. Commonwealth v. Campbell, No. 1010 Philadelphia 
1987, at 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jul. 26, 1988) (citations omitted). 
The Magistrate Judge, the District Judge, and the 
Commonwealth have reasoned that this is the 
determination of fact to which we must defer, and therefore 
that a S 2254(e)(2) hearing is inappropriate. Campbell 
contends both that the Superior Court's statement is not a 
determination of fact, and that the Superior Court, as an 
appellate court, did not have the power under Pennsylvania 
law to make such a finding on a cold record when making 
such a finding necessitated resolving a credibility dispute 
without having seen the witnesses testify. Neither the 
Magistrate Judge, the District Judge, nor the 
Commonwealth have addressed the latter argument. 
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The parties' and the Magistrate and District Judges' focus 
on the Superior Court opinion is not necessary. Under 
Pennsylvania law, the PCHA court was charged with 
making the finding of fact in question. See Commonwealth 
v. Johnson, 444 A.2d 1291, 1293 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) 
(describing the duty); Commonwealth v. Miranda , 442 A.2d 
1133, 1138-43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (same). Accordingly, it 
was the PCHA court's duty to resolve the credibility dispute 
between Campbell and trial counsel before passing 
Campbell's legal claim to the Superior Court. See 
Commonwealth v. Elliot, 466 A.2d 666, 668 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1983); Johnson, 444 A.2d at 1293 n.2; Miranda, 442 A.2d 
at 1138; see also infra Section II.C (explaining this 
procedure). We believe the PCHA court made thisfinding of 
fact, to which we must defer, and turn to this matter now. 
Before doing so, we note that in relying on the PCHA court's 
finding, we express no opinion as to whether in this precise 
factual circumstance, the Superior Court could have made 
this finding of fact on the cold appellate record, such that 
we would need to defer to it pursuant to AEDPA. 
 
C. 
 
In determining whether the PCHA court made a finding of 
fact resolving the credibility dispute between Campbell and 
his trial counsel, the prime evidentiary source is the PCHA 
court's written opinion. Through its repeated references to 
the insufficiency of the evidence that Campbell adduced to 
support his myriad ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, 
the PCHA court demonstrated--if in somewhat 
circumabulatory fashion--that it did not credit Campbell's 
testimony that his trial counsel failed to inform him of his 
right to choose to testify. While never explicitly crediting the 
testimony of Campbell's trial counsel, the PCHA court 
wrote: 
 
       It may be noted in passing that the allegedly new 
       issues raised by defendant at his Post Conviction 
       Hearing Act Hearing . . . are clearly unsupported by the 
       records . . . . 
 
       . . . 
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       The defendant has simply failed to carry his burden of 
       establishing ineffectiveness as to any specific issue 
       raised or collectively as to all of the issues raised. 
 
       Commonwealth v. Campbell, No. 666-84, at 3 (Pa. Ct. 
       Common Pleas Jan. 6, 1988). 
 
       This court does respectfully suggest that the 
       defendant's contention of ineffectiveness as to the 
       additional issues has not been established by the 
       evidence. 
 
       Id. at 4. 
 
As we read these passages, we believe that the PCHA 
court implicitly discredited Campbell's testimony. 
Borrowing from the Supreme Court's holding in LaVallee v. 
Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 692 (1973) (per curiam), 
"[a]lthough it is true that the state trial court did not 
specifically articulate its credibility findings, it can scarcely 
be doubted from its written opinion that [Campbell's] 
factual contentions were resolved against him." Although, 
as Campbell properly notes, the PCHA court made one of 
these remarks "in passing," Campbell, No. 666-84, at 3, the 
PCHA court was properly passing the legal resolution of 
these claims--based on the factual record it created--on to 
the Superior Court. Miranda and other Pennsylvania case 
law dictated that the PCHA court do so, and, in fact, 
prohibited the PCHA court from reaching out to dispose of 
the legal questions raised in those additional claims. 
 
Miranda held that "once the PCHA court determines 
petitioner has been deprived of his appellate rights, it 
should refrain from ruling upon the merits of the other 
claims and should grant petitioner the right tofile an 
appeal nunc pro tunc." 442 A.2d at 1138. In completing the 
record for appellate review as to the other claims,"the 
PCHA court is merely acting as an evidentiary tribunal." Id. 
(emphasis added). Cases interpreting Miranda hold the 
same. In Commonwealth v. Pate, the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court wrote, "[O]nce a PCRA court [the equivalent of PCHA 
court] determines that a petitioner's right to direct appeal 
has been violated, the PCRA court is precluded  from 
reaching the merits of other issues raised in the petition." 
617 A.2d 754, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (emphasis added). 
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This limitation on the powers and duties of the PCHA court 
may explain its somewhat tentative written opinion, as well 
as validate its (inchoate) fact-finding. 
 
Similarly, the fact that the PCHA court merely 
"suggest[ed]" that the evidence did not support Campbell's 
claims does not undermine our conclusion. Campbell, No. 
666-84, at 4. If anything, it bolsters it, for in attempting to 
determine the character of the PCHA court's statements, we 
also look to the court's legal conclusions and the rational 
deductions that we can draw therefrom. As the Supreme 
Court made clear in Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 
433 (1982), in determining what implicit factualfindings a 
state court made in reaching a conclusion, we must infer 
that it applied federal law correctly. Therefore, the PCHA 
court's suggestion to the Superior Court regarding the 
merits of Campbell's claims is helpful in determining what 
findings of fact it implicitly reached. See id.; see also 
Ahmad v. Redman, 782 F.2d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(applying the rule in Marshall). Put differently, our duty is 
to begin with the PCHA court's legal conclusion and reason 
backward to the factual premises that, as a matter of 
reason and logic, must have undergirded it. 
 
The PCHA court repeatedly suggested that Campbell's 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims had no legal merit. 
From this tentative legal conclusion one may infer that the 
PCHA court assumed that Campbell's trial counsel properly 
informed him of his right to testify. Otherwise, the legal 
conclusion would be invalid, because Campbell's lawyer 
would have deprived him of his constitutionally guaranteed 
right to choose whether to testify on his own behalf at trial. 
See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("[T]he 
accused has the ultimate authority to make certain 
fundamental decisions regarding the case, [including] as to 
whether to . . . testify in his or her own behalf."); see also 
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-56 (1987). As Marshall, 
459 U.S. at 433, teaches, we cannot assume that a state 
court would have so grossly misapplied our federal 
jurisprudence as to have reached the legal conclusion it did 
based on a factual finding to the contrary. 
 
Carrying through the logic from the PCHA court's 
suggested legal conclusion and the implicit factual 
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conclusion that drives it, we can infer that the PCHA court 
credited the testimony of Campbell's trial counsel over 
Campbell. If the PCHA court had credited Campbell's 
testimony, its implicit factual finding that Campbell was 
notified of his right to testify would be irrational. It would 
mean that the PCHA court found Campbell more credible, 
but understood him to say the opposite of what he said. 
 
A review of our precedent supports this mode of analysis. 
In McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 171-72 (3d Cir. 
1993), for example--a habeas case based on a ineffective- 
assistance-of-counsel claim--the defendant contended that 
his trial counsel had failed to obtain certain long-distance 
phone records that would have greatly bolstered his alibi 
defense. At a post-conviction hearing, the defendant 
testified that he had told his trial counsel that such records 
could be obtained from the phone company and that he 
had asked his lawyer to obtain them. See id. at 172. His 
trial counsel then testified that he did not know that the 
telephone company kept or could have produced such 
records. See id. "Faced with this conflicting evidence," the 
state post-conviction relief court hearing this evidence failed 
to resolve explicitly the credibility dispute between the 
defendant and his trial counsel. Id. The court did, however, 
"decide that trial counsel had thoroughly investigated and 
considered all the areas about which [the defendant] 
complained post-verdict." Id. In reviewing the state court's 
legal conclusion, we held that "[i]mplicit in this conclusion 
is a finding that trial counsel's testimony was credible. This 
finding is presumptively correct and should not be 
disturbed by a federal court on habeas review if it is fairly 
supported by the record." Id. (citing, inter alia, LaVallee v. 
Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 694-95 (1973) (per curiam)); see 
also Ahmad, 782 F.2d at 413 (reaching a similar conclusion 
on similar facts). 
 
In sum, under the Supreme Court precedent articulated 
in Marshall and LaVallee, and pursuant to our cases such 
as McAleese and Ahmad, although the PCHA court did not 
make its findings of fact explicit, we are bound by its 
implicit resolution of the credibility dispute between 
Campbell and his trial counsel. The PCHA court should 
have made its factual findings explicit, and it would have 
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been salutary for the Superior Court to have taken the 
PCHA court to task for not doing so. Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Townsell, 379 A.2d 98, 100 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) 
(noting "with disapproval" a PCHA court's failure to make 
its findings of fact explicit in the post-conviction relief 
hearing record); see also Commonwealth v. Elliot , 466 A.2d 
666, 668 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (noting that "[o]n prior 
occasions," and in the instant appeal, the Superior Court 
"ha[d] remanded for findings of fact where the P.C.H.A. 
hearing court failed to resolve conflicts in evidence or 
determine issues of credibility"). 
 
At all events, we hold that the PCHA court made a 
sufficient determination of the factual issue on which 
Campbell's habeas appeal turns. AEDPA dictates that we 
must presumptively defer to this determination absent clear 
evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C.S 2254(e)(1). As 
Campbell has introduced no such clear evidence, we 
further hold that ordering a new evidentiary hearing in this 
situation would be inappropriate. See supra Section II.A 
(discussing the circumstances in which a 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(e)(2) evidentiary hearing is appropriate). 
 
III. The Merits of Campbell's Substantive Habeas 
       Claim in Light of the PCHA Court's Findings 
 
In turning to the merits of Campbell's substantive habeas 
claim, we defer to the PCHA court's finding of fact that 
Campbell's trial counsel told Campbell that it was 
Campbell's choice whether to testify. The Superior Court 
hearing Campbell's nunc pro tunc appeal reviewed the 
evidence that the PCHA court implicitly credited--namely, 
that Campbell's trial counsel "absolutely" told Campbell it 
was Campbell's decision whether to testify, see supra note 
2--and reached the legal merits of Campbell's right-to- 
testify/ineffective-assistance claim. It held that the legal 
assistance given by Campbell's counsel had not been 
ineffective because Campbell "made a decision not to testify 
after full consultation. . . . [and] it appears that counsel 
had a reasonable basis designed to further appellant's 
interests, for not calling him to testify." Commonwealth v. 
Campbell, No. 1010 Philadelphia 1987, at 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
Jul. 26, 1988) (citations omitted). On habeas review, 28 
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U.S.C. S 2254(d) governs our review of the state court's 
substantive legal conclusion. 
 
As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d), provides 
that 
 
        (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus  on 
       behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment 
       of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 
       any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State 
       court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim 
       -- 
 
       (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, o r 
       involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
       established Federal law, as determined by the 
       Supreme Court of the United States; or 
 
       (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 
       unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 
       the evidence presented in the State court 
       proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C.A. S 2254(d) (West Supp. 1999). 
 
We address these two potential grounds for habeas relief 
in reverse order. At the PCHA hearing, Campbell's trial 
counsel testified unequivocally that he informed Campbell 
of his right to testify and that he assured him it was 
Campbell's ultimate decision, alone, whether to testify. See 
supra note 2. Campbell testified to the contrary. See id. A 
reasonable fact-finder could discount Campbell's testimony 
and credit his trial counsel's. Therefore, the state PCHA 
court did not make an unreasonable determination of the 
facts in light of the evidence presented when it implicitly 
reached that conclusion. Accordingly, habeas relief is 
unwarranted under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(2). 
 
We next turn our attention to 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1). In 
reaching its legal conclusion, the Superior Court applied 
the federal standard regarding ineffective-assistance-of- 
counsel claims articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984). Based on the facts presented it 
concluded that Campbell's trial counsel did not render 
ineffective assistance. The Court reasoned, appropriately, 
that Campbell's trial counsel did not render ineffective 
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assistance by warning him that if he were to take the 
witness stand and recant his remorse-filled confession, he 
would likely alienate the jury. If anything, this was sound 
advice. The factual record to which we must defer 
demonstrates that this advice went no further than 
counseling, and that trial counsel did not suggest to 
Campbell that he could not testify, even if he chose to do 
so. 
 
On these facts, the Superior Court applied federal law in 
a reasonable manner in concluding that Campbell's trial 
counsel did not render ineffective assistance under the 
"objective reasonableness" standard articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Strickland. See, e.g. , United States v. 
Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534-35 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that counsel's performance was not constitutionally 
deficient, in case in which defendant was advised of his 
right to testify, but was advised that he should not exercise 
that right because it would be unwise and unnecessary). As 
this decision was not "contrary to . . . clearly established 
Federal law," or an "unreasonable application of " such law, 
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1), habeas relief underS 2254(d)(1) is 
unwarranted, see Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 
F.3d 877, 888-91 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (establishing the 
analytical framework, under AEDPA, for reviewing the legal 
conclusions reached by state courts based on federal law). 
The District Court's order denying habeas relief will 
therefore be affirmed. 
 
       BY THE COURT: 
 
        /s/ Edward R. Becker 
       ________________________ 
       Chief Judge 
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